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Abstract
This paper challanges the view that weak work norms in generous welfare states makes
them economically unsustainable. I develop a dynamic model of family-transmitted values
that has a laissez-faire equilibrium with strong work norms coexisting with a social-insurance
equilibrium with weak work norms. While the former has better incentives, the latter induces
more intergenerational occupational mobility which improves the allocation of talent and fuels
growth. Strong work norms arise as a defensive strategy of parents that aims at perpetuating
their occupation along family lines. I present evidence from microdata showing that generous
social insurance correlates with high intergenerational occupational mobility and that more
mobile individuals endorse weaker work norms.
Keywords: work norms, unemployment insurance, occupational mobility, economic growth.
JEL-Classication: H2, O0, Z1.
1 Introduction
This paper proposes a novel view of the interaction between the generosity of social insurance
towards the unemployed, the work norms held by the population, and economic performance.
The prevailing view was developed by Lindbeck (1997), Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) and Lind-
beck et al. (1999). It purports that generous social insurance weakens the work norms endorsed
by individuals, i.e. the symbolic value they attach to achieving self-supportiveness through own
work. A self-destructive dynamics may then set in as weak work norms increase welfare depen-
dency and worsen macroeconomic performance, which in turn endangers the scal sustainability
of social insurance. Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) present cross-country evidence of a negative
relationship between self-reported work norms and the share of social expenditure to GDP.
The current paper o¤ers a less negative view of weak work norms and generous social in-
surance against unemployment. It grounds on a model of endogenous social insurance where
individuals choose a career under imperfect information about their occupational talent. Family
ties shape the labor-market outcomes of individuals. Ex post, parents can raise the productivity
of their untalented children if they chose the same occupation. The model exhibits two types of
equilibria: one with generous unemployment benets and weak work norms and one with meager
benets and strong work norms. While the latter equilibrium features better incentives to take
up jobs, the former one has a better allocation of talent to occupations. Output and growth need
not be higher in the equilibrium with strong work norms, and the two equilibria may coexist.
Such a model thus contributes to explain the so called free-lunch puzzle of the welfare state, i.e.
the failure to detect any clear overall negative e¤ect of large tax-nanced transfers on GDP.1
My model pins down the role of parenting styles and insurance provision for determining
labor market outcomes. If parents expect high unemployment benets, they push their children
to choose careers with a high expected productivity and a high unemployment risk. To this end,
they adopt a liberal parenting style that encourage children to cultivate their talents and does
not stigmatize the unemployed. If parents expect meager unemployment benets, they promote
safe career choices with lower expected productivity and lower unemployment risk. To this
end, they transmit strong work norms that stigmatize unemployment and force their children
into their own occupation, where parents help protect them from professional failure. Strong
work norms are thus a way of substituting private for social insurance against unemployment
1That puzzle was put forward by Lindert (2004); see Pestieau (2006) for some qualications and an overview
on social insurance and economic e¢ciency.
As stressed by Bénabou (2000), the variety of national tax-transfer systems can be understood as resulting from
multiple equilibria such that none of them dominates the others in terms of long-run economic growth. Alesina
and Angeletos (2005) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006) ofer related models. There the laissez-faire equilibrium
dominates, in terms of national income, the welfare-state equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Generosity of unemployment benets and intergenerational occupational mobility.
risk. Across equilibria, the generosity of unemployment benets negatively correlates with the
inheritance of occupation along family lines.
Figure 1 shows that across European countries generous unemployment benets are indeed
correlated with high intergenerational occupational mobility. The generosity index on the hori-
zontal axis captures the ratio of the after-tax unemployment benet payable to a typical worker
to that workers after-tax wage, as computed by Scruggs and Allan (2006). The vertical axis has
the fraction of male adults that follow the occupational footsteps of their fathers. That variable
is obtained from the European Values Study of 2008 which reports the four-digit ISCO code of
the occupation of both the respondent and his father when the respondent was fourteen.2 The
inheritance of occupations is negatively correlated with the generosity of unemployment benets
and the regression line has a R2 close to .55.3 That negative correlation is robust with respect
to controls for individual characteristics of the respondents in the various countries. Taking
the country-xed e¤ects from a regression that explains the probability to inherit the fathers
occupation yields a scatter plot similar to Figure 1.
This paper is divided into a theoretical and an empirical part. After discussing related strands
of literature, Sections 3-6 develop a dynamic model of work norms instilled by parents, in which
individuals make a career choice with imperfect knowledge of their talent and may become
unemployed if they turn out to be unproductive at their chosen occupation. The generosity of
social insurance towards the unemployed is determined through voting. The key assumption is
that if children are in the same occupation as their parents they are never entirely unproductive,
whereas failure is possible if their occupations di¤er. This captures the idea that when individuals
2All countries for which both sources of information are available have been used.
3A similar negative relationship obtains when using a general score of generosity of social insurance, which
incorporates sickness and pension benets along with unemployment benets.
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follow their parents footsteps in the labor market they can prot from both the network of
contacts and the occupation-specic human capital that they inherit from their parents, so that
unemployment is unlikely even in the absence of personal talent. Using a model of talent-driven
endogenous growth, two regimes obtain as steady states. In one, all children choose their parents
occupation, work norms are strong, and there is neither unemployment nor unemployment
insurance. In the alternative regime, children adopt whichever occupation they are likely to
be talented for, work norms are weak, and there are both unemployment and unemployment
insurance. Even if work norms are weaker, growth can be higher in the welfare-state equilibrium
because there are more individuals who are highly productive at their occupation.
The empirical part in Section 7 presents some evidence from individual data that lends
support to the main insights of the model. Its key assumption - choosing a parents occupation
protects from unemployment - ts well with the data, as conditional correlations show that
followers have a lower probability to benet from unemployment insurance. Moreover, the
distinctive predictions of the model are consistent with the data: followers exhibit stronger work
norms than individuals who experience intergenerational occupational mobility and the sons of
unemployed fathers endorse weaker work norms than other people.
2 Links to the literature
Work norms refer to self-supportiveness: persons who are able to work should work so as to
support themselves by their own work and they should not rely on support by others. In
Lindbeck (1997) the disutility from deviating from such a norm is assumed to decrease with the
share of transfer recipients. Since transfer recipients may be individuals who break the norm,
his model exhibits a critical-mass e¤ect: the larger the share of the population that violates the
norm, the smaller the utility loss from violating it, and the stronger the incentive to live o¤
handouts from the government. There can be both an equilibrium with large norm compliance
and ostracism of the unemployed and one where the norm breaks down. Lindbeck et al. (1999)
show that under endogenous social insurance there can be either a laissez-faire equilibrium,
supported by a majority of potential taxpayers, or one with a generous welfare state, supported
by a majority of transfer recipients. The laissez-faire equilibrium is the one where the norm is
obeyed and the economy thrives. Also in the model of this paper there are equilibria with either
weak or strong norms; however, economic performance needs not be better in the equilibrium
with strong norms.
Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) endogenize work norms as the outcome of a purposive socializa-
tion process. Parents instill a work norm in their children so as to mitigate childrens free-riding
on parents altruism. Social insurance shifts some of the costs of childrens free riding from the
parents to the government and weakens the incentive for parents to instill a work norm. In a
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related model, Gradstein (2010) allows families to invest in education and shows that education
subsidies can prevent work norms from deteriorating. The current paper shares the view that
parents purposively inuence their childrens work norms. However, those norms are modeled
as resulting from a broader value system that parents transmit to their children, as in Corneo
and Jeanne (2009, 2010).4 Values, self-respect and social status depend not only on whether
somebody is a transfer recipient or a worker, but also on that persons occupation. This is
consistent with the observation that occupational pride and prestige are important ingredients
in the choice of careers and occupations (Arcidiacono, 2004; Dolton et al.; 1989, Humlum et al.,
2012).
A few papers have o¤ered models of endogenous work attitudes, as e.g. Doepke and Zilibotti
(2008) and Gradstein (2009). While work norms refer to self-supportiveness through own work,
work attitudes refer to the willingness to substitute leisure for consumption at the margin. Those
papers show that the intergenerational transmission of work attitudes can help to explain long-
term patterns of income mobility, whereby children of poor parents can overtake children of rich
parents. Di¤erently from the current paper, those papers do not deal with social insurance.5
Considerable empirical work has been devoted to exploring the relationship between chil-
drens and their parents labor market outcomes. A strand of literature has documented the
extent of intergenerational persistence in occupational choice, whereby the fathers occupation
is found to be an important determinant of the sons occupation. However, most studies employ
a broader denition of occupation than in this paper, one based on its socio-economic status or
class, see e.g. Constant and Zimmermann (2003) and references therein. Another related study
is Corak and Piraino (2011), about the intergenerational transmission of employers. Using Cana-
dian data, they nd that 6-9 % of a cohort of young men have the same employer in adulthood
for which their father worked. That is driven by fathers providing both informational networks
and specic human capital to their children. The importance of the role of family networks
for labor market outcomes is conrmed by Kramarz and Skans (2011), who analyze Swedish
data. They nd that family networks favor the transition between school and work especially
for children with low schooling and poor grades. There are also empirical studies that nd an
important e¤ect from parents joblessness on childrens earnings (Oreopoulos et al., 2008) and
unemployment (Corak et al., 2004, Österbacka, 2004, and Page, 2004). My model is consistent
with the main ndings of the empirical literature: (i) there is a signicant intergenerational
persistence in occupational choice; (ii) following a parents occupational footsteps is especially
4Bisin and Verdier (2000) o¤er a related approach to the intergenerational transmission of values and attitudes.
5Algan and Cahuc (2009) investigate the role of civic virtue in explaining the presence of employment protection
rather than unemployment benets. Civic virtue is endogenized by Michau (2012) as a response to unemployment
insurance and by Cervellati and Vanin (2013) as a response to crime temptation. Corneo and Grüner (2000) and
Cervellati et al. (2010) analyze the role of social stigma and prestige in shaping governmental redistribution in
the absence of an insurance motive.
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helpful for less talented individuals; (iii) parents unemployment has a negative impact on the
labor market outcomes of their children.
Finally, the model in this paper is related to that part of growth theory that puts forward
the allocation of talent as a key growth factor, as in Fershtman et al. (1996), Galor and Tsiddon
(1997), Hassler and Rodriguez Mora (2000), and Murphy et al. (1991). The current paper
stresses the benets in terms of accumulated knowledge that accrue to society if individuals
perform an activity for which they are talented. In my model, individuals are horizontally dif-
ferentiated with respect to their talents; a coincidence of talents and occupations spurs creativity
and new ideas, whereas a mismatch results in technological stagnation. This focus distinguishes
the current paper from the previous literature that stresses the role of vertically di¤erentiated
talent in human capital investment and in the choice of entrepreneurial activities.
3 Model
At any time period t 2 f0; 1; 2:::g there is a continuum of dynasties i 2 [0; 1]. Individual it is the
parent of individual it+1 and lives one period. Every individual may either work and choose one
of two occupations, referred to as a and b. Or, the individual may be unemployed and receive
social benets, in which case his (in)activity is denoted by u. Activity u may be thought of as
alternating periods of unemployment with periods of work activity in jobs that do not require
any special skill.
In every period t, the following sequence of events occurs for every dynasty.
1. Individual it internalizes a value system instilled by it 1. A value system is a mapping
that associates non-negative indexes v(; it) - symbolic values - with activities x 2 fa; b; ug. As
values are intrinsically relative I use the normalization
v(a; it) + v(b; it) + v(u; it) = 1: (1)
The strength of the work norm endorsed by individual it, n(it), is dened as the symbolic value
that individual it attaches to working:6
n(it)  v(a; it) + v(b; it):
2. Individual it receives a signal about his unknown talent (it) 2 fa; bg. Talents are
identically and independently distributed in the population. The signal about talent may be
either a or b. The unconditional probability of each signal is 1=2; the conditional probabilities
are
6 It could equivalently be dened as the di¤erence between the symbolic value attached to working and the one
attached to living o¤ the welfare state.
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Prfi;t = aj(ii) = ag = Prfi;t = bj(it) = bg = p; (2)
where p 2 (1=2; 1) is the precision of the signal. It can be thought of as mirroring the quality of
the education system.7
3. Individual it chooses an occupational specialization s(it) 2 fa; bg. Having a specialization
is a necessary requirement for working in the corresponding occupation.
4. Individuals it 2 [0; 1] vote over balanced social insurance schemes ( t; zt) and one is
collectively chosen.  t 2 [0; 1] is the wage tax rate and zt  0 is the unemployment benet.
5. Nature privately reveals to each individual his talent (it), upon which the individuals
productivity is determined. The productivity of individual it depends both on his talent for the
chosen occupation and on his parents activity, x(it 1) 2 fa; b; ug. If s(it) = (it), individual
its gross hourly wage is (1 + )wt, where  > 0 is the talent premium. If s(it) 6= (it), the wage
is wt > 0 if s(it) = x(it 1) and 0 otherwise. Thus, untalented individuals can earn a positive
wage only if they have followed their parents occupational footsteps.
6. Individuals choose their work hours h(it) 2 [0; 1], produce, and are paid their market
wage according to their productivity.
7. Consumption levels c(it) are determined by redistributing the wage sum according to the
social-insurance scheme.
Individuals derive utility from consumption, leisure, self-esteem and social esteem. Their
preferences are described by a logarithmic utility function,
U = ln c+ ln(1  h) +  ln selfv +  ln socv;
where c is consumption, 1   h is leisure, selfv captures self-esteem, and socv is social esteem.
Within each family, all individuals have the same "deep" preferences - parameters  and  -
while they may attach di¤erent symbolic value to the various activities. The weight of the
self-esteem concern in an individuals utility function is captured by   0. An individuals
self-esteem is the value of his activity according to his value system:
selfv(x(it)) = v(x(it); it):
The strength of the concern for social esteem is captured by   0. The social esteem in which
an individual is held is the average of the esteem granted to his activity over the whole society:
socv(x(it)) =
Z 1
0
v(x(it); jt)djt: (3)
7By allowing for the possibility that individuals lack any talent and correspondingly rescaling the probabilities
of signals, one could introduce vertical talent di¤erentiation along with the horizontal one. All key results would
be qualitatively una¤ected.
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A possible interpretation has individuals being randomly matched into pairs and exchanging
courtesy and hostility according to their values.
The baseline productivity level in the economy, wt, is determined by the economy-wide stock
of knowledge Kt as of
wt = Kt; (4)
where  > 0 is a parameter. The stock of knowledge accumulates as a by-product of the work
of talented individuals. It evolves according to
Kt+1 = [1 + g(Ht)]Kt; (5)
where Ht is the total number of hours worked by individuals who are talented for their occupa-
tion. Function g satises g(0)  0 and g0 > 0.
An equilibrium is
- a distribution of value systems, occupational specializations, and work hours at each period
((v(x; it), s(it), h(it))it2[0;1]),
- levels of social esteem at each period (socv(xt)xt2fa;b;ug),
- a social insurance scheme at each period ( t; zt),
- and a productivity level at each period (wt),
such that:
- for each it, the values v(x; it+1), x 2 fa; b; ug maximize the expected utility of it+1 subject
to (1), given socv(xt)xt2fa;b;ug,  t, zt, and wt,
- socv(xt)xt2fa;b;ug obtains from the individually chosen values as of (3),
- for each it, the occupational specialization s(it) and work hours h(it) maximize his expected
utility conditional on socv(xt)xt2fa;b;ug,  t, zt, wt, and his private information,
- ( t; zt) maximizes the sum of the expected utilities of the voters among all ( ; z) that satisfy
the budget constraint of the government in period t,
- equations (4) and (5) apply.
The initial conditions are a distribution of activities for the initial parents generation,
x(i0)i02[0;1] and an initial stock of knowledge, K0 > 0. I posit that less than half of the initial
parents generation was unemployed and that employment was equally splitted between the two
occupations.
4 Individual choices
For each individual, rst his values, then his specialization, and nally his work hours are
determined under the relevant constraints so as to maximize his expected utility under rational
expectations. Those variables are now determined by backward induction.
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4.1 Labor supply
Consider an individual who can earn a net hourly wage ! > 0. Dropping the time index, his
optimal number of hours, conditional on working, obtains from
maxfln c+ ln(1  h)g
subject to
c = !h:
The solution has
h =
1
2
:
Individual productivity is private information and individuals who can earn a positive wage can
mimick those who are unproductive and live o¤ the welfare state. The mimicking decision is
a¤ected by ones values. The utility level when working in occupation x 2 fa; bg is given by
ln
!
4
+  ln vx +  ln vx;
where vx and vx respectively refer to the self-esteem and the social esteem obtained from working
in occupation x. If the individual mimicks an unproductive one, he gets utility
ln z +  ln vu +  ln vu:
Therefore, productive individuals only participate in the labor market if
ln
!
4z
  ln
vu
vx
+  ln
vu
vx
: (6)
The incentive constraint (6) plays a key role in this model. A more generous social insurance
reduces ! and raises z; thereby it decreases the l.h.s. of (6), i.e. the material gain from working.
This is the direct disincentive e¤ect from social insurance. Without value concerns ( =  = 0),
individuals only work if !  4z. The e¤ect of work norms is captured by the r.h.s. of (6) which
represents the intangible gain from not working. If individuals su¤er a su¢ciently large loss of
self-esteem and/or social esteem when living o¤ the welfare state, generous social insurance can
go along with intact willingness to work. However, over time a generous social insurance could
erode work norms, i.e. increase the r.h.s. of (6), and eventually diminish the willingness to work.
This is the indirect disincentive e¤ect from social insurance.
4.2 Occupational specialization
At the interim stage, every individual has received a signal about his talent and chooses his occu-
pational specialization s(i) 2 fa; bg so as to maximize his expected utility, correctly anticipating
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his e¤ective labor supply in each state of the world. That choice is a¤ected by the activity of the
parent: entering the same occupation as the one performed by the parent secures the individual
a positive wage even if he turns out to be untalented for that occupation. To illustrate, consider
the child of somebody who worked in occupation a and suppose that he received the signal a.
His expected utility from choosing specialization a is:
EU(aja; a) = pmax

ln
w(1 + )(1  )
4
+  ln va +  ln va; ln z +  ln vu +  ln vu

+
+(1  p)max

ln
w(1  )
4
+  ln va +  ln va; ln z +  ln vu +  ln vu

:
The expected utility from specialization b is:
EU(bja; a) = (1  p)max

ln
w(1 + )(1  )
4
+  ln vb +  ln vb; ln z +  ln vu +  ln vu

+
+p [ln z +  ln vu +  ln vu] :
The individual chooses the specialization s(i) = a if and only if EU(aja; a)  EU(bja; a).
Since occupations a and b are perfectly symmetric, optimal career choices are fully charac-
terized by three rules. The rst one, derived above, concerns the children who have received the
signal that they are talented for their parents occupation. The second one is used by children
who have received the signal that they are talented for an occupation di¤erent from their parents
one. The third one is the choice rule for the children of the individuals who were unemployed
in the previous period.
4.3 Value systems
In the rst stage, before talent signals are received, parents select the value system of their chil-
dren correctly anticipating their childrens decision rules concerning specialization and working
time. Optimal transmission of values can be di¤erent for parents with a job and for the unem-
ployed because their childrens opportunity sets are di¤erent. Therefore, I examine their choices
separately. The analysis assumes that social esteem satises va = vb  v > vu, something which
turns out to be the case in equilibrium. Proofs of all results are relegated to the Appendix.
4.3.1 Children of the unemployed
When instilling a value system, a parent can either set values that make her child choose a given
career independently of the signal he will receive about his talent; or the parent can transmit
values such that her childs career choice will condition on the received signal. The former
is an instance of paternalism because family-instilled values fully determine the childs future
behavior. In the sequel, I use the term paternalism only if the values are set so as to make the
child choose to be a worker, conditional on being talented. If values make the child shun work,
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the child is said to be endowed with a welfare culture. I call the alternative socialization strategy
- letting the child choose according to his perception about own talent - liberalism.8
In the case of paternalism, unemployed parents are a priori indi¤erent between bestowing
value on a or b, so say that in the case at hand specialization into occupation a is selected.
Provided the incentive constraint (6) holds,9 the childs expected utility amounts to
1
2

ln
w(1 + )(1  )
4
+ ln z + (ln va + ln vu) + (ln v + ln vu)

:
The optimal value system under paternalism is a triple (va; vb; vu) in the 2-simplex that maxi-
mizes the above expression. Solving that maximization problem shows that the optimal social-
ization strategy is to set va = vu = 1=2, and vb = 0.10 With logarithmic utility, the symbolic
value invested in each activity always equals the probability of that activity. Substituting back,
expected utility in case of paternalism amounts to
1
2

ln
w(1 + )(1  )
4
+ ln z

+  ln
1
2
+

2
(ln vvu): (7)
Consider now the case of liberalism, i.e. the option to transmit values such that the child will
choose his specialization according to the received signal. The corresponding expected utility
reads
p ln
w(1 + )(1  )
4
+ (1  p) ln z+ 
hp
2
(ln va + ln vb) + (1  p) ln vu
i
+  [p ln v + (1  p) ln vu] :
The optimal value system under liberalism has va = vb = p=2, and vu = 1   p. Substituting
back, the resulting expected utility is
p ln
w(1 + )(1  )
4
+ (1  p) ln z +  ln
pp(1  p)1 p
2p
+  ln vpv1 pu : (8)
Finally, parents may opt to instill a welfare culture such that their children will always shun
work. In that case, their expected utility is ln z +  ln vu +  ln vu. Optimal welfare culture
has vu = 1 and va = vb = 0. Then, the individual obtains utility ln z +  ln vu with certainty.
Comparing that utility level with (7) and (8) and selecting the highest one yields the optimal
socialization strategy.
Dene y  ln[w(1 + )(1   )=4z], a variable that is inversely related to the generosity of
social insurance. Optimal values can be characterized by reference to y.
Lemma 1 There exist scalars y1, y2, y3, and p 2 (1=2; 1) such that the following holds true.
Suppose p > p; then, the optimal socialization strategy for parents who are unemployed is welfare
8As shown in psychological studies of parenting, both paternalism and liberalism occur in practice. Psy-
chologists dene parenting styles by means of various expressions that are closely related to what is termed
here paternalism / liberalism: restrictive / permissive, authoritarian / authoritative, high-control / low-control
parenting. For a detailed account of that literature, see e.g. Grusec and Kuczynski (1997).
9The fulllment of all relevant incentive constraints is shown in the Appendix.
10Or vb = vu = 1=2 and va = 0 if occupation b is targeted.
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culture if y < y3 and it is liberalism if y > y3. Suppose p < p; then, optimal socialization entails
a welfare culture if y < y1, paternalism if y1 < y < y2, and liberalism if y > y2.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. The generosity of social insurance, as
captured by the inverse of y, determines the relative material reward of working. If social
insurance is very generous, individuals prefer to live on public transfers and get endowed with
a welfare culture, so that they enjoy a high level of self-esteem although they are transfer
recipients. If social insurance is less generous, optimal values prepare the children to enter the
labor market. Since unemployed parents cannot help their children in the labor market, they
might be expected to encourage their children to follow the signal they receive about their talent.
This is, however, not always the case. If the signal about talent is very noisy - p close to 1=2
- paternalism in occupational choice can be optimal if social insurance is su¢ciently generous.
Conditional on being employed, self-esteem is higher if the individual was raised according to
paternalism rather than liberalism. This advantage of paternalism can more than o¤set the
disadvantage of a lower probability of earning a wage, provided that the unemployment benet
is high enough.
The thresholds y1, y2 and y3, that determine which socialization strategy is optimal, depend
on the preference parameters  and  - see Appendix A. If preferences di¤er across families,
parents may opt for di¤erent socialization strategies, as found in parenting research.
4.3.2 Children of working parents
As compared to the children of the unemployed, the children of employed parents face a larger
opportunity set since they can earn a wage in their parents occupation even if they are not
talented for that occupation. Correspondingly, their parents set of potentially optimal social-
ization strategies is larger. Again, a parent can either transmit values that make her child
choose a given career independently of the signal he will receive about his talent; or the parent
can transmit values such that her childs career choice will condition on the received signal. In
the case of working parents, a further distinction must be made within each class of socialization
strategies: in case of lack of talent but same occupation as parent, values may either induce the
child to work or shirk. The option to set values that make the child work in his parents occupa-
tion independently of talent is termed family specialization. The option that consists of instilling
values so that the child chooses his occupational specialization by following the signal about his
ability and always works if he choose his parents occupation is called talent orientation. For the
corresponding cases where the individual does not work if he chose his parents occupation and
is not talented for it, I use the terms "paternalism" and "liberalism" used above as in fact those
strategies are the same for both working parents and unemployed parents. Of course, also the
option of instilling a welfare culture leads to the same value system for the children of working
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parents as for the children of the unemployed. To sum up, as compared to the unemployed,
working parents have two additional options: family specialization and talent orientation, both
of which entail the expectation that the child will work even if he turns out to lack the talent
for the chosen specialization, provided that it is the same as his parents one.
In order to determine which socialization strategy is optimal, consider rst the option of
family specialization and suppose without any loss of generality x(it 1) = a. In this case, the
optimal value system obviously has va = 1 and vb = vu = 0. The individuals expected utility
associated with family specialization is therefore
ln
w(1  )
4
+
1
2
ln(1 + ) +  ln v: (9)
Consider now the option of talent orientation. It yields expected utility
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:
The optimal value system under talent orientation maximizes the above expression under the
constraint (1). It has va = 1=2, vb = p=2, and vu = (1  p)=2. The resulting expected utility is
1 + p
2
ln
w(1  )
4
+ p ln(1 + ) +
1  p
2
ln z +

2
ln
pp(1  p)1 p
4
+

2
ln v1+pv1 pu : (10)
If the allocation of talent is important, i.e.  is large enough,11 the following fact can be
established:
Lemma 2 There exist scalars y4, y5, and y6 such that the following holds true. Suppose
p > p; then, the optimal strategy for parents who had an occupation is welfare culture if y < y3,
liberalism if y3 < y < y4, talent orientation if y4 < y < y5, and it is family specialization if
y > y5. Suppose p < p; then, their optimal strategy is welfare culture if y < y1, paternalism
if y1 < y < y2, liberalism if y2 < y < y4, talent orientation if y4 < y < y5, and it is family
specialization if y > y5.
The most interesting case that can arise in equilibrium is the one where the children of work-
ing parents are socialized either according to talent orientation or family specialization. That
requires y > y4. Those two socialization strategies can be part of the same general equilibrium
if  and  di¤er across families and the individual-specic thresholds y5 are distributed within
a su¢ciently narrow interval that includes y. Then, families that care relatively more about es-
teem socialize their children according to family specialization, while families that care relatively
11Formally,  is assumed to be bounded from below so as to meet a condition stated in Appendix B. That
condition is supposed to be met in what follows.
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more about consumption and leisure opt for talent orientation. This has direct implications for
the strength of the work norm endorsed by individuals, n(it) = v(a; it) + v(b; it). Self-reliance
is always achieved by individuals raised to follow their parents occupational footsteps, so that
n(it) = 1 for those individuals. Families that bet on their childs talent face instead a risk of
failure in the labor market and transmit more tolerant values, implying n(it) = (1 + p)=2 < 1.
Thus, we have:
Corollary 1 Suppose that in equilibrium some individuals are socialized according to talent
orientation and others according to family specialization. Then, those who work in the same
occupation as their parents endorse on average stronger work norms than those who do not work
in their parents occupation.
Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that the children of the employed may have values that di¤er from
those of the children of the unemployed even if their utility functions are identical. In the case of
identical utility functions, all thresholds yj , j 2 f1; ::5g, are the same for everyone and if y > y4,
the children of the unemployed are predicted to endorse weaker work norms. Since y4 > y3, the
children of the unemployed are raised according to liberalism, which is associated with n(it) = p.
The children of working parents are instead raised according to either talent orientation, in which
case n(it) = (1 + p)=2 > p, or family specialization, in which case n(it) = 1 > p. We thus have:
Corollary 2 Under common preferences, the children of the unemployed exhibit weaker work
norms than the remaining individuals in their generation.
Corollaries 1 and 2 are distinctive testable predictions of the current model. They will be
confronted with the data in Section 7.
5 Short-run general equilibrium
Assume for the sequel that families have identical preferences. In the general equilibrium,
the levels of social esteem va, vb, and vu, as well as the social insurance scheme ( ; z) are
endogenously determined. The social esteem levels associated with working and with living on
transfers are determined by aggregation of the value choices made by all parents, as of (3). Tax
rate and transfer are determined by voting, which occurs after the individuals have received
their signal about talent and have selected their career, but before their actual talent is realized.
So, the veil of ignorance has not been lifted at the moment of voting on the social insurance
scheme. I posit probabilistic voting, where the platform that arises in equilibrium is one that is
feasible and maximizes the sum of the expected utilities of the voters.12
12Analyzing the case of majority voting leads to similar results but is more cumbersome because of the associated
discontinuities.
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The electorate selects a social insurance scheme that satises the budget constraint of the
government. The per-capita tax revenue amounts to
w
2
(
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h
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 
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
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
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
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 
1+
2
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+
+(1  ) [nlp(1 + ) + np(1 + )=2]
)
: (11)
In the above expression,  denotes the fraction of individuals whose parents had an occupation.
The fraction of employed parents who specialized the values of their children to an occupation is
denoted by ms; mt denotes the fraction that adopted values of talent orientation; ml the fraction
that opted for liberalism; mp the fraction that chose paternalism. With respect to the (1   )
children of transfer recipients, nl denotes the fraction that diversied the values of their children
according to liberalism, and np the fraction of unemployed parents who chose paternalism. The
per-capita outlay of social insurance is given by
z
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2
i
: (12)
The budget constraint of the government is satised if per-capita outlay equals per-capita tax
revenue.
In a short-run politico-economic equilibrium, social insurance is a pair ( ; z) that satises
the budget constraint of the government and maximizes the sum of the expected utilities of all
voters after they have received their ability signal but before their wage rate is realized. That
voting outcome is correctly foreseen when people make their individual decisions.
Without signicant loss of insight, the analysis can be restricted to the case of p > p,
which guarantees that in equilibrium the social esteem of the employed is larger than the social
esteem of the unemployed. There are two relevant congurations to examine. The rst one
has all children of working parents being raised according to family specialization. Among all
potentially optimal socialization strategies, this is the one that attaches the lowest symbolic
value to lack of self-relience and the highest value to work. Therefore, I refer to this outcome as
to the strong work-norms equilibrium, SNE for short.
Proposition 1 If the concerns for self-esteem and social esteem are strong enough ( and 
su¢ciently large), a SNE exists. In that equilibrium, the average strength of work norms is given
by
NS = + (1  )p: (13)
In a SNE, all individuals whose parents worked follow their parents occupational footsteps.
Hence, those individuals face no risk of becoming unemployed and derive no benet from social
insurance. Since they constitute the majority of the population, the electorate selects a small
social insurance program. This conguration only builds an equilibrium if the concern for the
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symbolic rewards of self-supportiveness is large enough. That concern prompts people to work
even if their productivity turns out to be low. Conversely, if people did not care much about
esteem, they would rather live on transfers in case of low productivity. But in that case, it would
be better for them to maximize the probability of having a high productivity, which is achieved
by following the signal about ones talent. This explains why family specialization only arises
in equilibrium if the concerns for self-esteem and social esteem are strong enough.
The second relevant conguration is the one where all parents who have a job socialize their
children according to talent orientation. To contrast it with the SNE, I refer to that situation
as to the weak work-norms equilibrium, WNE for short.
Proposition 2 There exists a compact set X  <2+ such that if (; ) 2 X, a WNE exists. The
average strength of work norms in such an equilibrium equals
NW = 

1 + p
2

+ (1  )p: (14)
The WNE can readily be compared with the equilibrium of an economy where values do
not matter, i.e.  =  = 0. In such an economy, individuals choose their specialization by
following their talent signal. This implies that both the preferences of voters over ( ; z)-pairs
as well as the budget constraint of the government in case all productive individuals work
are precisely the same as in the WNE of the corresponding economy where esteem matters.
However, the incentive constraint (6) is di¤erent in the two model economies, which means that
not all productive individuals may work in the economy without symbolic values under the social
insurance scheme that is selected in the WNE. As can be easily veried, that social insurance
scheme, denoted by (W ; zW ), indeed violates the incentive constraint for the individuals with
low productivity in an economy without values, i.e.
w(1  W ) < 4zW : (15)
As a consequence, the following fact can be established:
Proposition 3 In a WNE, material social welfare is larger than in the equilibrium of an oth-
erwise identical economy where symbolic values do not matter.
Material social welfare is the sum of all expected utilities derived from consumption and
leisure. Thus, material payo¤s are higher if individuals do not care only about material payo¤s.
A concern about esteem is a commitment device that allows the polity to implement a more gen-
erous level of social insurance without violating incentive compatibility. This commitment e¤ect
of values is conducive to a higher level of material welfare because insurance is underprovided
in equilibrium.13
13 In the economy without values, the incentive constraint for working is binding and equilibrium social insurance
is determined by that constraint and the budget constraint of the government. In the economy with values, the
incentive constraint for working is not binding in equilibrium.
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If values matter, i.e.  > 0 and  > 0, individuals optimally develop work norms that
have the e¤ect to relax the incentive constraints faced by social insurance. Interestingly, the
strength of those work norms needs not be uniquely determined in equilibrium. For some set
of parameters, both the SNE and the WNE can be sustained, i.e. the model exhibits multiple
short-run equilibria.
Proposition 4 For any given , there exists a compact set such that if (; ) belongs to it, both
the SNE and the WNE exist. The tax rate is lower in the SNE than in the WNE. The output
level is larger in the SNE than in the WNE if and only if
 <
1  p
2p  1
:
In one equilibrium, parents believe that their children will live in a society where the unem-
ployed will fare decently as compared to successful workers. In case of bad luck, individuals will
receive generous social benets without being stigmatized. Thus, parents want their children
to cultivate their individual talent even if this exposes them to the risk of failure in the labor-
market. Parents raise children in that way by bestowing occupations and joblessness with rather
similar values. In the sequel, children choose specializations that may di¤er from their parents
ones and face the threat of unemployment. Thus, in their position as voters, they highly value
social insurance. A relatively generous scheme is then selected, which conrms parents initial
forecast about the good treatment of the unemployed and vindicates their socialization choice.
Given the same economic fundamentals, parents may instead believe that in case their chil-
dren will be unemployed, the benet they will receive will be meager and other people will
ostracize them. Therefore, parents opt for the safe strategy of preparing their children to enter
the same occupation as they are in, so that the parent can help if the child lacks talent. Those
parents transmit a strong occupational pride and, as a consequence, society as a whole heavily
stigmatizes the unemployed. When those children have become adults who vote, they have spe-
cialized as their parents and therefore face no risk of unemployment. Since they constitute the
majority of voters, the voting outcome has a meager social insurance which, together with the
low social esteem conferred upon the unemployed, conrms the forecast on which the parents
based their socialization choice.
Proposition 4 states that if  and p are large enough, aggregate output is higher in the WNE
than in the SNE. Parameter p captures the extent to which talent is better allocated in the
WNE, and  captures the importance of talent for generating output. If those two parameters
are su¢ciently large, the better allocation of talent in the WNE more than compensates its
lower level of employment as compared to the SNE.
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6 Steady state
The dynamics of the model is driven by the evolution of employment in two ways. First, the
employment rate in period t determines the fraction of children who can be helped in the labor
market by their parents in period t+1. Second, the total number of hours worked by individuals
who are talented for their job in period t determines the increment in the stock of knowledge
between that period and period t+ 1. The asymptotic behavior of the economy is described by
the steady state equilibrium. A steady state equilibrium is a short-run equilibrium such that
the employment rate, the average strength of work norms, and the tax rate do not change over
time while the stock of knowledge, output, wages, and the unemployment benet grow at an
identical constant rate.
The steady state equilibria of this model parallel the two stylized facts mentioned at the out-
set: the negative cross-country relationship between generosity of social insurance and average
strength of work norms, and the absence of a positive impact of strong work norms on economic
performance.
Proposition 5 Both the SNE and the WNE admit a steady-state equilibrium. There exists a
compact set such that if (; ) belongs to it, both the SNE and the WNE exist as steady states.
In the steady state, the SNE features a laissez-faire economy whereas the WNE has a social
insurance; while the employment level is higher in the SNE, growth is faster in the WNE.
The above Proposition delivers two insights that may appear paradoxical at rst glance.
The rst one concerns the relationship between economic role of the government and parenting
style. In the long run, a laissez-faire economy has interventionist parents, while an economy with
governmental intervention has laissez-faire parents. The second paradox is about work norms
and macroeconomic performance. In the long run, a population that attaches less value to being
productive brings about a higher production level.
Of those two paradoxical insights, only the rst one, which relates paternalism in the family
to the lack of social insurance, is robust. The lower rate of economic growth in the equilibrium
with strong work norms hinges on the assumption that the utility function is logarithmic. In
the model, the growth rate increases with the total number of hours worked by individuals who
are talented for their occupation. That number depends on the portion of the workforce that is
e¢ciently allocated to an occupation and on the hours worked by each talented employee. In
the steady state, the portion of e¢ciently allocated workforce is p in the WNE and 1=2 < p in
the SNE. Wages are taxed at a strictly positive rate in the WNE, but not in the SNE. Since
the utility function is Cobb-Douglas, the substitution e¤ect from a change in the net wage is
exactly o¤set by its income e¤ect, so that employees work the same number of hours in the
two equilibria. This explains why the growth rate is unambiguously higher in the WNE than in
17
the SNE. Under more general assumptions, the substitution e¤ect can dominate and the total
number of hours worked by talented employees need not be higher in the WNE than in the SNE.
As a result, the long-run growth rate can be similar in the two equilibria, which strengthens
the plausibility of a stable coexistence of di¤erent compacts: one based on paternalistic families,
strong work norms, persistence of occupations along family lines, and minimal government, and
one based on a liberal parenting style, weak work norms, intergenerational occupational mobility,
and generous social insurance.
7 Some empirical evidence
As a preliminary step, I briey summarize ndings in Corneo (2012) about the correlation
between work norms and income at the individual level. That investigation exploited data
from the World Values Survey pertaining to respondents in OECD countries. In order to have a
proxy for lifetime income, only individuals aged between thirty-ve and fty-ve were considered.
Those respondents were then grouped into quintiles of the household income distribution in the
country of the respondent. Contrary to popular views, weak work norms were not found to
correlate with low income even after controlling for many individual characterstics.
In what follows, I use data from the European Values Study of 2008 which appears to be the
only large-scale cross-national survey that includes both a measure of the strength of work norms
and precise information about the occupations of the respondent and the respondents father.14
The European Values Study of 2008 reports the four-digit ISCO code of the occupations of the
respondent and his father when the respondent was fourteen. Followers, i.e. individuals who
have followed their fathers footsteps in the labor market, are dened as those for whom their
ISCO code coincides with their fathers one. The analysis is restricted to male respondents aged
between twenty-ve and fty-ve who lived with their fathers when they were fourteen.15
The rst piece of evidence pertains to the key assumption that being a follower protects from
unemployment. Table 1 reports results from logit estimations of the probability to benet from
unemployment insurance. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent
has been unemployed during the last ve years. All specications include unreported country
xed e¤ects and a constant. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. The variable
of interest, the dummy "Follower", equals 1 if the respondent has the same occupation as his
father. In the rst specication, the only additional control variable is the age of the respondent.
The second specication also includes family status and job status. Education is added in
the third specication and income - expressed in twelve categories - in the fourth one. The
14See http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu.
15See Appendix L for the descriptive statistics of the sample. A symmetric analysis for women cannot be
conducted because mothers occupations were not recorded. Appendix Q reports the results concerning women
who have the same occupation as their fathers.
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estimation results are strongly in line with the assumption that followers face a lower risk of
unemployment. I nd that being a follower reduces the probability to have been unemployed by
about six percentage points.
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Table 1: Logit regressions for experience of unemployment during last
ve years; males, aged 25-55.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Follower -0.200* -0.297** -0.369*** -0.435***
(-2.21) (-3.07) (-3.60) (-3.93)
Age -0.124*** -0.083** -0.086** -0.081*
(-4.06) (-3.04) (-3.08) (-2.43)
Age squared 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001
(3.64) (2.22) (2.21) (1.65)
Legal status
- married -0.377*** -0.406*** -0.328***
(-5.26) (-5.70) (-3.71)
- divorced 0.114 0.078 -0.001
(1.08) (0.74) (-0.01)
- widowed -0.538 -0.634* -0.662
(-1.75) (-2.08) (-1.82)
Job status
- Part-time work 0.664*** 0.657*** 0.576**
(3.76) (3.78) (3.17)
- Self-employment 0.038 0.005 0.059
(0.35) (0.05) (0.46)
- Retired 0.637** 0.575** 0.428*
(3.11) (2.84) (1.97)
- Household production 2.071*** 2.056*** 2.067***
(7.36) (6.85) (7.38)
- Student 0.945** 1.023** 0.529
(3.07) (3.21) (1.18)
- Unemployed 3.227*** 3.167*** 2.823***
(18.67) (18.37) (16.55)
- Other 1.643*** 1.529*** 1.201***
(7.30) (6.89) (5.74)
Education
- Primary education 1.035* 1.295*
(1.97) (2.32)
- Some secondary education 0.773 1.072
(1.46) (1.86)
- Secondary education 0.425 0.761
(0.78) (1.26)
- Tertiary education 0.013 0.584
Income No No No Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,559 11,479 11,438 9,760
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Consider now the distinctive predictions of the model about the relationship between parental
background in the labor market and endorsed work norms: followers exhibit stronger work norms
than individuals who experience intergenerational occupational mobility (Corollary 1) and the
children of the unemployed endorse weaker work norms than other people (Corollary 2). The
endorsement of a norm of self-supportiveness can be recovered from the following survey question
in the European Values Study of 2008. Respondents were asked whether they agree with the
following statement: "It is humiliating to receive money without having to work for it". This
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question captures the extent to which esteem depends on self-reliance, which is precisely how the
strength of work norms enters the model. Respondents could choose "Strongly agree", "Agree",
"Neither agree nor disagree", "Disagree", or "Strongly disagree". I use those answers as a
measure of respondents endorsement of self-supportiveness as a value.
Results from ordered-logit estimations of the probability to endorse strong work norms are
reported in Table 2. All specications include unreported country xed e¤ects and a constant.
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. The specications become stepwise richer
following the same procedure as for the regressions in Table 1. Results strongly conrm the
prediction of the model that inheriting the parents occupation is associated with endorsing a
stronger work norm.16
16By way of an example, being a follower raises the probability to answer "Strongly agree" from 21.9 % to 25
% in the fourth specication.
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Table 2: Ordered logit regressions for strength of work norms; males,
aged 25-55.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Follower 0.156** 0.154** 0.135* 0.173**
(2.70) (2.69) (2.23) (2.68)
Age 0.005 -0.024 -0.027 -0.037
(0.28) (-1.42) (-1.59) (-1.86)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001*
(0.29) (1.72) (1.86) (2.15)
Legal status
- married 0.259*** 0.250*** 0.230***
(4.81) (4.66) (4.52)
- divorced 0.113 0.099 0.102
(1.45) (1.25) (1.17)
- widowed 0.505* 0.481* 0.433*
(2.53) (2.36) (2.15)
Job status
- Part-time work -0.136 -0.141 -0.177
(-1.39) (-1.42) (-1.82)
- Self-employment 0.047 0.031 0.053
(0.69) (0.45) (0.70)
- Retired 0.041 0.023 -0.005
(0.39) (0.21) (-0.04)
- Household production -0.747*** -0.754*** -0.857***
(-3.56) (-3.55) (-3.42)
- Student -0.215 -0.211 -0.368
(-0.89) (-0.86) (-1.31)
- Unemployed -0.166* -0.195** -0.266***
(-2.22) (-2.62) (-3.69)
- Other -0.396** -0.440** -0.417**
(-2.76) (-2.99) (-3.06)
Education
- Primary education -0.317 -0.206
(-1.64) (-1.05)
- Some secondary education -0.365 -0.239
(-1.69) (-1.12)
- Secondary education -0.418* -0.285
(-2.01) (-1.43)
- Tertiary education -0.533* -0.403
(-2.47) (-1.90)
Income No No No Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,454 11,372 11,333 9,686
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 3 presents estimation results from regressions that take into account the prediction from
Corollary 2. Accordingly, the children of the unemployed are predicted to endorse weaker work
norms than the rest. Therefore, I modify the regression equations of Table 2 by adding a dummy
variable that takes value 1 if the respondents father was unemployed when the respondent was
fourteen and 0 otherwise. Consistently with Corollary 2, fathers unemployment signicantly
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contributes to explain the endorsement of a weak work norm.17
Table 3: Ordered logit regressions for strength of work norms; males,
aged 25-55.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Follower 0.156** 0.154** 0.134* 0.172**
(2.69) (2.68) (2.21) (2.68)
Father unemployed -0.731*** -0.723*** -0.765*** -0.381***
(-27.45) (-11.85) (-9.71) (-4.27)
Age 0.005 -0.024 -0.027 -0.037
(0.28) (-1.42) (-1.58) (-1.86)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001*
(0.29) (1.71) (1.86) (2.15)
Legal status
- married 0.259*** 0.251*** 0.231***
(4.83) (4.68) (4.53)
- divorced 0.113 0.099 0.102
(1.46) (1.25) (1.17)
- widowed 0.513* 0.488* 0.436*
(2.56) (2.39) (2.16)
Job status
- Part-time work -0.136 -0.142 -0.177
(-1.39) (-1.42) (-1.82)
- Self-employment 0.046 0.031 0.053
(0.68) (0.45) (0.70)
- Retired 0.040 0.022 -0.005
(0.38) (0.21) (-0.04)
- Household production -0.733*** -0.739*** -0.847***
(-3.50) (-3.49) (-3.41)
- Student -0.216 -0.212 -0.368
(-0.89) (-0.87) (-1.32)
- Unemployed -0.166* -0.195** -0.266***
(-2.22) (-2.62) (-3.69)
- Other -0.397** -0.442** -0.417**
(-2.77) (-2.99) (-3.06)
Education
- Primary education -0.313 -0.204
(-1.60) (-1.04)
- Some secondary education -0.364 -0.238
(-1.68) (-1.11)
- Secondary education -0.418* -0.285
(-2.01) (-1.43)
- Tertiary education -0.533* -0.403
(-2.47) (-1.90)
Income No No No Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,454 11,372 11,333 9,686
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Robustness checks presented in the Appendix corroborate the ndings in Tables 1-3. I nd
similar results for both OECD and non-OECD countries (Appendix M and N). Results do not
17 In the fourth specication the probability to answer "Strongly agree" decreases by about six percentage points
if the father was unemployed.
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hinge on employment in agriculture, as they survive when one controls for it Appendix O) and
they obtain separately for most ISCO-groups, although not for every group (Appendix P).
Overall, the predictions of the model t well with the pattern of intergenerational occupa-
tional mobility revealed by the data. At the aggregate level - as shown in the Introduction -
occupational mobility is high in countries where unemployment insurance is generous. At the
individual level, occupational mobility correlates with relatively weak work norms.
8 Conclusion
This paper has developed a model that portrays persisting di¤erences in terms of generosity
of social insurance as the result of multiple steady-state equilibria. In one equilibrium, the
democratically chosen social insurance scheme is generous and people do not emphasize self-
supportiveness as a value; in the other equilibrium, the polity opts for a minimal safety net
and people endorse strong work norms. Because of counterveiling e¤ects, macroeconomic per-
formance needs not to be worse in the equilibrium with generous social insurance. On the one
hand, that equilibrium has individuals that are more easily tempted to live o¤ the welfare state,
which restricts the set of economic outcomes that the polity can achieve. On the other hand,
those individuals do not have to rely on their families help in the labor market and can go
their own way, choosing a career in accordance with their perceived talent. In terms of aggre-
gate output, the improvement in the allocation of talent may more than o¤set the disincentive
to take up jobs. The two equilibria generated by the model are associated with di¤erences in
parenting styles and patterns of occupational choice: liberal parents and high intergenerational
occupational mobility in the case of social insurance; paternalism and widespread inheritance of
occupation in the case of laissez faire.
Based on survey data, I have shown various pieces of empirical evidence that corroborate the
insights from the theoretical model. Across European countries, more generous unemployment
insurance comes along with more intergenerational occupational mobility. At the individual
level, men who follow their fathers occupational footsteps face a lower unemployment risk and
are more likely to endorse strong work norms. The view of social insurance and work norms
proposed in this paper may thus contribute to explain the pluralism of observed regimes and, in
particular, the possibility to sustain a regime of generous social insurance despite the negative
correlation between the generosity of social insurance and the strength of work norms.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1.
By comparing (8) with (7), one can determine the circumstances under which liberalism is
preferred to paternalism, namely when the following condition is satised:
ln
w(1 + )(1  )
4z
 y >  
2
2p  1
ln pp(1  p)1 p21 p    ln
v
vu
 y2: (16)
The condition for preferring welfare culture over occupational paternalism is
y < 2 ln 2   ln
v
vu
 y1: (17)
The condition for preferring welfare culture over liberalism is
y <  

p
ln
pp(1  p)1 p
2p
   ln
v
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 y3: (18)
Dene p 2 (1=2; 1) as the unique root of18
p ln
1
2
= ln

pp(1  p)1 p

:
If p < p, then p ln 12 > ln p
p(1  p)1 p, which can be rewritten as
ln pp(1  p)1 p + p ln 2 < 0
or
2p ln 2 <   ln pp(1  p)1 p + p ln 2:
Using the denitions in (17) and (18), this is equivalent to y3 > y1. By the same token, p < p
implies
2p

ln pp(1  p)1 p + (1  p) ln 2

< (2p  1)

ln pp(1  p)1 p   p ln 2

:
Using (16) and (18), this is equivalent to y2 > y3. As a consequence, p < p implies y1 < y3 < y2.
Then, by (17) and (18), welfare culture is optimal if y < y1. By (17) and (16), paternalism is
optimal if y1 < y < y2. By (16), liberalism is optimal if y > y2.
The above reasoning also shows that p > p implies y2 < y3 < y1. In that case, if y < y3,
then y < y1 and by (17) and (18) welfare culture is optimal. If y > y3, then y > y2 and by (16)
and (18) liberalism is optimal. QED
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 2.
By comparing (10) with (9), one can determine the condition for talent orientation to be
preferred over family specialization:
18 It may be noted that p  0:77.
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y <
p
1  p
ln(1 + ) +

1  p
ln
pp(1  p)1 p
4
   ln
v
vu
 y5: (19)
Now, determine the circumstances under which talent orientation is preferred to the strategies
of liberalism and of welfare culture. By comparing (10) with (8), one can determine when talent
orientation is preferred over liberalism, namely when the following condition is satised:
y > ln(1 + ) +

1  p
ln pp(1  p)1 p41 p    ln
v
vu
 y4: (20)
By comparing (10) with ln z +  ln vu, the condition for talent orientation to be better than
welfare culture amounts to:
y >
1  p
1 + p
ln(1 + ) 

1 + p
ln
pp(1  p)1 p
4
   ln
v
vu
 y6: (21)
If  is large, the following holds true: y5 > y4 > y6 > maxfy1; y2; y3g. These inequalities
are assumed to hold throughout. If y > y5, by (19) family specialization is superior to talent
orientation, which, by (20) and (21), is superior to the remaining strategies. If y4 < y < y5, by
(19) and (20) talent orientation is superior to family specialization and to liberalism, which is
superior to everything else. The rest follows from Proposition 1. QED
Appendix C: Incentive compatibility of working.
The preceeding proofs implicitly assumed that the incentive compatibility condition (6) is
fullled in equilibrium, i.e. given optimally chosen values and specialization. I now show that
this is indeed the case. First, consider the case where paternalism is optimal. The incentive
constraint reads
y    ln
v
vu
: (22)
According to (17), paternalism arises in equilibrium only if
y  2 ln 2   ln
v
vu
:
Thus, the incentive constraint (22) is satised in equilibrium if 2 ln 2  0, which is obviously
true.
Consider the case where parents opt for liberalism. The incentive constraint reads
y   ln
2(1  p)
p
   ln
v
vu
: (23)
If p < p, a necessary condition for liberalism to occur in equilibrium is, by (16),
y   
2
2p  1
ln pp(1  p)1 p21 p    ln
v
vu
= y2:
Thus, the incentive constraint (23) is satised if
y2   ln
2(1  p)
p
   ln
v
vu
:
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By straightforward manipulations, the above inequality can be reduced to 2p(1  p)  1, which
is true since p 2 (1=2; 1).
If p > p, a necessary condition for liberalism to occur in equilibrium is, by (18),
y   

p
ln
pp(1  p)1 p
2p
   ln
v
vu
= y3:
Thus, the incentive constraint (23) is satised if
y3   ln
2(1  p)
p
   ln
v
vu
:
By straightforward manipulations, the above inequality can be written
  ln pp(1  p)1 p  ln
1  p
p
;
which is true since the l.h.s. is positive and the r.h.s. is negative.
Finally, consider talent orientation. By (20), the value system associated with it only arises
in equilibrium if
y  ln(1 + ) +

1  p
ln pp(1  p)1 p41 p    ln
v
vu
= y4: (24)
The case of talent orientation is associated with two incentive constraints: one for the untalented,
and one for the talented. The incentive constraint for the untalented - who have specialized in
their parents occupation - reads
ln
w(1  )
4z
  ln(1  p)   ln
v
vu
:
By (24), this incentive constraint is satised if
y4  ln(1 + ) +  ln(1  p)   ln
v
vu
:
By straightforward manipulations, the above inequality can be written as
p ln p  2(1  p) ln
1
2
:
It is easy to show that the above condition is always met if p 2 (1=2; 1). If the individual has
not specialized in his parents occupation, the incentive constraint reads
y   ln
1  p
p
   ln
v
vu
:
By (24), this is satised if
y4   ln
1  p
p
   ln
v
vu
;
which is equivalent to
ln(1 + )   

ln pp(1  p)1 p
1  p
+ ln 4 + ln
p
1  p

:
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One can always choose  large enough, so that the above inequality holds. In particular, it is
implied by the assumption y4 > y6, as one can readily verify. QED
Appendix D: Incentive compatibility of shirking.
Productive individuals mimick unproductive ones in the cases of paternalism and liberalism
if they turn out to be untalented for the chosen occupation. I now show that in equilibrium they
do have an incentive to shirk. First, suppose that the socialization strategy optimally selected
by parents was the one of paternalism. By (6), an untalented individual shirks if
ln
w(1  )
4z
<   ln
v
vu
; (25)
or, equivalently, if
y < ln(1 + )   ln
v
vu
:
According to Proposition 1, a necessary condition for paternalilsm to be optimal is y < y2.
Hence, the incentive condition (25) is fullled if
ln(1 + )   ln
v
vu
 y2:
Substituting out y2 yields
ln(1 + )   
2
2p  1
ln pp(1  p)1 p21 p:
One can always choose  large enough, so that the above inequality holds. In particular, it is
implied by the assumption y5 > y4, as one can readily verify.
Suppose now that liberalism is optimal. By (6), an untalented individual shirks if
ln
w(1  )
4z
<  ln
2(1  p)
p
   ln
v
vu
:
Using (20), this condition is necessarily satised if
y5  ln(1 + ) +  ln
2(1  p)
p
   ln
v
vu
:
After some manipulations, the above condition can be written as
ln p  (1  p) ln
1
2
 0:
It is easy to show that the above condition is always met if p 2 (1=2; 1).
Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 1.
In a SNE, all parents who have a job invest all symbolic value in their own occupation. As
implied by Lemma 2, in order for this to be individually optimal, one must have y > y5. Since
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y5 > y3, by transitivity y > y3 and by Lemma 1 the parents who live on the transfer choose their
childrens values according to liberalism, i.e. va = vb = p=2, and vu = 1  p. By aggregating the
symbolic values attached to work you obtain (13). Notice that, by (3), in equilibrium the social
esteem received by workers amounts to
vS =
+ (1  )p
2
; (26)
while the social esteem of transfer receipients is
vSu = (1  )(1  p): (27)
In a SNE, at the voting stage one half of all individuals who were raised by employed parents
have expected utility
EU( ; z) = p ln
w(1 + )(1  )
4
+ (1  p) ln
w(1  )
4
+ const:
These are the individuals who received the signal that they are likely to be talented for the
chosen occupation. The remaining half is likely to be untalented for their occupation and their
expected utility is given by
EU( ; z) = p ln
w(1  )
4
+ (1  p) ln
w(1 + )(1  )
4
+ const:
The expected utility of the individuals whose parents were transfer recipients is
EU( ; z) = p ln
w(1 + )(1  )
4
+ (1  p) ln z + const:
The sum of voters expected utilities yields the following social welfare function:
SW ( ; z) = [+ p(1  )] ln(1  ) + (1  )(1  p) ln z + const: (28)
By probabilistic voting, the outcome of the vote is a pair (S ; zS) that maximizes that welfare
function under the budget constraint implied by the incentive constraints characterizing all
individuals. In a SNE, the selected policy is consistent with a budget constraint derived under
the premise that all productive individuals work, i.e. by (11)-(12),
w
2



1 +

2

+ (1  )p(1 + )

= z(1  )(1  p): (29)
Maximization of (28) subject to (29) yields
S = (1  )(1  p); (30)
zS =
w
2



1 +

2

+ (1  )p(1 + )

: (31)
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A SNE exists if and only if (S ; zS) vindicates the associated individual choices with respect
to values, specialization and labor supply, and if there is no di¤erent ( ; z) such that a higher
level of social welfare can be reached at the voting stage, given the distribution of values and
specializations. Thus, in order for (S ; zS) to be part of a SNE,
yS  ln
w(1 + )(1  S)
4zS
(32)
must be larger than y5 as given by (19) and where social esteem levels are determined by (26)
and (27), i.e.
yS 
p
1  p
ln(1 + ) +

1  p
ln
pp(1  p)1 p
4
   ln
+ (1  )p
2(1  )(1  p)
 yS5 : (33)
This condition ensures that the posited socialization strategies are optimal and nobody has an
incentive to shirk. Substituting (30) and (31) into (32) reveals that condition (33) is equivalent
to
  aS   bS; (34)
where aS > 0 and bS > 0 are functions of ,  and p. Condition (34) is satised if and only if 
and  are large enough.
It remains to be shown that the social insurance scheme preferred by the electorate lies on
the piece of the governments budget contraint derived under the premise that all productive
individuals work, i.e. on (29). The argument can be made using Figure 2, where (S ; zS)
corresponds to the point where the social indi¤erence curve is tangent to the budget constraint
(29). The complete budget constraint faced by the electorate is the bold piecewise linear curve
which includes a piece for relatively large ( ; z)-combinations such that the individuals raised
by transfer recipients prefer not to work. The straight line (6) shows the incentive constraint
for the children of the unemployed. Notice that ( ; z)-combinations on that piece of the budget
constraint are dominated in terms of social welfare by ( ; z)-combinations on the virtual budget
constraint where all productive individuals work, as shown by (29). In turn, those virtual
( ; z)-combinations are dominated by (S ; zS) by construction. Hence, the latter is indeed the
electorates preferred social insurance scheme among all those that are feasible. QED
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Figure 2: Determination of social insurance in the SNE.
Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 2.
In a WNE, all parents who have a job impart values that make their children specialize in
the occupation for which they are more likely to be talented. Optimality of those values requires
y > y4. Since y4 > y3, it follows that y > y3 and the parents who live on transfers bestow their
children with values according to liberalism. From this, (14) directly follows. Notice that the
resulting social esteem of workers is given by
vW = 

1 + p
4

+ (1  )
p
2
; (35)
while the social esteem of welfare receipients is
vWu = 

1  p
2

+ (1  )(1  p): (36)
At the voting stage, the children of employed parents who specialized in the same occupation
as their parents have expected utility given by
EU( ; z) = p ln
w(1 + )(1  )
4
+ (1  p) ln
w(1  )
4
+ const:
The expected utility of the remaining individuals amounts to
EU( ; z) = p ln
w(1 + )(1  )
4
+ (1  p) ln z + const:
The resulting social welfare function reads
SW ( ; z) =

(1  p)
2
+ p

ln(1  ) + (1  p)

1 

2

ln z + const: (37)
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The voting outcome maximizes this welfare function under the budget constraint of the govern-
ment. In a WNE, the selected policy is consistent with a budget constraint derived under the
premise that all productive individuals work, i.e. by (11)-(12),
w
2

p(1 + ) + 

1  p
2

= z



1  p
2

+ (1  )(1  p)

: (38)
Maximization of (37) subject to (38) yields
W =
(2  )(1  p)
2
; (39)
zW =
w
4
[2p(1 + ) + (1  p)] : (40)
In order for (W ; zW ) to be part of an equilibrium, it must make employed parents instill values
of talent orientation. By Prop. 2, one must have y4  yW  y5, where
yW  ln
w(1 + )(1  W )
4zW
: (41)
By (20), (35) and (36), the rst inequality can be written as
yW  ln(1 + ) +

1  p
ln pp(1  p)1 p41 p    ln
2p+ (1  p)
2(2  )(1  p)
 yW4 :
Substituting (39) and (40) into (41) reveals that the above condition is equivalent to
  f  m; (42)
where f > 0 and m > 0 are functions of ,  and p.
The second inequality, yW  y5, amounts to
yW 
p
1  p
ln(1 + ) +

1  p
ln
pp(1  p)1 p
4
   ln
2p+ (1  p)
2(2  )(1  p)
 yW5 :
By substituting as before, the above condition is equivalent to
  aW   bW; (43)
where aW > 0 and bW > 0 are functions of ,  and p. It can easily be shown that aW > f , so that
there exists a compact set X  <2+ such that if (; ) 2 X, both inequalities, y
W
4  y
W  yW5 ,
are satised. By the same method applied to prove Prop. 1 it can be shown that there is no
di¤erent ( ; z) such that a higher level of social welfare can be reached at the voting stage, given
the distribution of values and specializations. QED
Appendix G: Proof of Proposition 3.
In order to show (15), substitute (39) and (40) into it and rearrange terms so as to get
4p(1 + )  2 + (1  p)(+ 2) > 0;
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which is true. The Proposition then directly follows from the main text. QED
Appendix H: Proof of Proposition 4.
In order to show that the SNE and WNE can coexist it is su¢cient to exhibit a subset in the
(; )-space such that each of its elements can sustain both the SNE ane the WNE. By the proofs
of existence of those equilibria, such a subset exists if aW > aS . Tedious but straightforward
manipulations conrms that this condition is always met.
The tax rate of social insurance in the SNE is given by (30) and the tax rate in the WNE is
given by (39). It is easily seen that W > S .
The result about output stems from comparing output in the SNE,
QS = w
h
2
(1 + ) +

2
+ p(1  )(1 + )
i
with output in the WNE,
QW = w

p(1 + ) +
(1  p)
2
+ p(1  )(1 + )

:
QED
Appendix I: Proof of Proposition 5.
In the SNE, the dynamics of the employment rate is given by
St+1 = 
S
t + p(1  
S
t ): (44)
Its steady state has S = 1. Substituting into (30) yields S = 0. Substituting into (13) yields
NS = 1. In order to determine the growth rate, notice that half of the employed are talented
for their job and that each of them devotes half of his time to working. Therefore, the growth
rate in the steady state is gS = g (1=4).
In the WNE, the dynamics of the employment rate is given by
Wt+1 =

1 + p
2

Wt + p(1  
W
t ): (45)
Its steady state has W = 2p=(1 + p) < 1. Substituting that steady-state variable into (39)
yields W = (1  p)=(1 + p) > 0. Substituting into (14) yields NW = 2p=(1 + p) < 1. In order
to determine the growth rate, notice that a share p of each generation turns out to be talented
for its jobs and that each individual devotes half of his time to working. Therefore, the growth
rate in the steady state is gW = g (p=2) > g (1=4).
In the WNE, the dynamics of the employment rate is given by (45), which has a stable root.
The WNE must also satisfy conditions (42) and (43) which depend on t. As long as neither of
them is binding, which is generically the case, the steady state is locally stable.
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In the SNE, the dynamics of the employment rate is given by (44), which has a stable root.
The SNE must also satisfy condition (34) which depends on t. As long as that condition is
not binding, which is generically the case, the steady state is locally stable. One can even prove
a stronger stability property: once in a short-run SNE, the economy always remains in a SNE
and evolves according to (44). Suppose namely that the economy is in a short-run SNE with
St < 1. As implied by (44), 
S
t+1 > 
S
t . Straightforward manipulations show that increasing 
makes condition (34) less stringent, so that if it was satised in period t it remains so in period
t+ 1.
The latter property can be used to prove the existence of multiple steady states. By Prop.
4, for any given , there exists a compact set such that if (; ) belongs to it, both the SNE and
the WNE exist. Set  = W, which correponds to the steady state in the WNE, and assume
that (; ) is such that both short-run equilibria exist. By construction, the WNE is a steady
state. By the stability property established above, the SNE converges to a steady state. QED
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Appendix L: Descriptive statistics.
List of countries in the European Values Survey of 2008.
Albania Germany Northen Cyprus
Armenia Great Britain Northern Ireland
Austria Greece Norway
Azerbaija Hungary Poland
Belarus Iceland Portugal
Belgium Ireland Romania
Bosnia He Italy Russian F
Bulgaria Kosovo Serbia
Croatia Latvia Slovak Re
Cyprus Lithuania Slovenia
Czech Rep Luxembour Spain
Denmark Macedonia Sweden
Estonia Malta Switzerla
Finland Moldova Turkey
France Montenegr Ukraine
Georgia Netherlands
Descriptive Statistics of the sample.
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Work norm 14416 3.55 1.18 1 5
Follower 11652 0.09 0.28 0 1
Father unemployed 14092 0.08 0.27 0 1
Age 14690 39.96 8.97 25 55
Age squared 14690 1676.88 718.84 625 3025
Education
- No education 14597 0.01 0.10 0 1
- Primary education 14597 0.05 0.22 0 1
- Some Secondary education 14597 0.13 0.34 0 1
- Secondary education 14597 0.52 0.50 0 1
- Tertiary education 14597 0.29 0.45 0 1
Legal status
- maried 14587 0.66 0.48 0 1
- divorced 14587 0.08 0.26 0 1
- widowed 14587 0.01 0.11 0 1
- single 14587 0.26 0.44 0 1
Job status
- Full-time work 14619 0.65 0.48 0 1
- Part-time work 14619 0.04 0.19 0 1
- Self-employment 14619 0.12 0.33 0 1
- Retired 14619 0.03 0.16 0 1
- Household Production 14619 0.01 0.09 0 1
- Student 14619 0.02 0.13 0 1
- Unemployed 14619 0.13 0.33 0 1
- Other 14619 0.02 0.14 0 1
Income
- Category 1 12382 0.10 0.30 0 1
- Category 2 12382 0.12 0.32 0 1
- Category 3 12382 0.15 0.36 0 1
- Category 4 12382 0.18 0.38 0 1
- Category 5 12382 0.10 0.30 0 1
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- Category 6 12382 0.07 0.25 0 1
- Category 7 12382 0.06 0.25 0 1
- Category 8 12382 0.06 0.23 0 1
- Category 9 12382 0.11 0.31 0 1
- Category 10 12382 0.04 0.20 0 1
- Category 11 12382 0.01 0.11 0 1
- Category 12 12382 0.01 0.09 0 1
Appendix M: Regressions for OECD countries.
The following Tables A1-A3 present the results from regressions that replicate those in Tables
1-3 using only OECD countries.
Table A1: ONLY OECD - Logit regressions for experience of un-
employment during last ve years; males, aged 25-55.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Follower -0.288* -0.326* -0.387* -0.395*
(-2.01) (-2.09) (-2.46) (-2.31)
Age -0.136*** -0.073* -0.079* -0.084
(-3.87) (-1.99) (-2.11) (-1.85)
Age squared 0.001*** 0.001 0.001 0.001
(3.33) (1.28) (1.32) (1.24)
Legal status
- married -0.388*** -0.395*** -0.249*
(-4.49) (-4.68) (-2.27)
- divorced 0.222 0.202 0.184
(1.55) (1.47) (1.21)
- widowed -0.544 -0.635 -0.398
(-0.93) (-1.10) (-0.73)
Job status
- Part-time work 0.890** 0.890*** 0.838***
(3.28) (3.44) (3.72)
- Self-employment -0.097 -0.118 -0.077
(-0.57) (-0.69) (-0.36)
- Retired 0.329 0.255 0.009
(1.23) (0.96) (0.03)
- Household production 2.101*** 2.051*** 1.809*
(3.76) (3.60) (2.55)
- Student 0.567 0.618 -0.240
(1.43) (1.52) (-0.45)
- Unemployed 3.651*** 3.611*** 3.227***
(17.60) (17.82) (15.95)
- Other 1.639*** 1.519*** 1.120***
(5.87) (5.65) (4.37)
Education
- Primary education 0.206 0.529
(0.44) (1.20)
- Some secondary education -0.056 0.395
(-0.12) (0.74)
- Secondary education -0.383 0.063
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(-0.83) (0.12)
- Tertiary education -0.686 -0.002
(-1.53) (-0.00)
Income No No No Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,788 6,743 6,715 5,595
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A2: ONLY OECD - Ordered logit regressions for strength of
work norms; males, aged 25-55.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Follower 0.181* 0.179* 0.151 0.171
(2.26) (2.34) (1.82) (1.94)
Age 0.001 -0.029 -0.035 -0.058*
(0.05) (-1.30) (-1.57) (-2.22)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001*
(0.29) (1.38) (1.63) (2.21)
Legal status
- married 0.263*** 0.258*** 0.208**
(3.57) (3.52) (2.91)
- divorced 0.189* 0.171 0.177*
(2.19) (1.92) (1.98)
- widowed 0.624** 0.592** 0.626***
(2.73) (2.61) (3.90)
Job status
- Part-time work -0.049 -0.051 -0.097
(-0.27) (-0.27) (-0.55)
- Self-employment 0.018 0.003 0.023
(0.21) (0.03) (0.26)
- Retired 0.149 0.122 0.187
(1.23) (0.98) (1.34)
- Household production -1.198** -1.224*** -1.387**
(-3.23) (-3.30) (-2.93)
- Student -0.278 -0.267 -0.454
(-0.96) (-0.92) (-1.30)
- Unemployed -0.121 -0.161 -0.242*
(-1.03) (-1.35) (-1.97)
- Other -0.583*** -0.650*** -0.556***
(-4.29) (-4.59) (-4.22)
Education
- Primary education -0.283 -0.135
(-1.21) (-0.56)
- Some secondary education -0.216 -0.052
(-0.82) (-0.19)
- Secondary education -0.358 -0.198
(-1.32) (-0.73)
- Tertiary education -0.532 -0.408
(-1.89) (-1.44)
Income No No No Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,706 6,663 6,636 5,543
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t-Statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A3: ONLY OECD - Ordered logit regressions for strength of
work norms with father unemployed; males, aged 25-55.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Follower 0.180* 0.179* 0.150 0.171
(2.24) (2.33) (1.80) (1.93)
Father unemployed -0.689*** -0.625*** -0.675*** -0.291*
(-22.54) (-7.17) (-6.14) (-2.05)
Age 0.001 -0.029 -0.035 -0.058*
(0.06) (-1.30) (-1.57) (-2.22)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001*
(0.29) (1.38) (1.63) (2.21)
Legal status
- married 0.264*** 0.258*** 0.208**
(3.58) (3.53) (2.91)
- divorced 0.189* 0.171 0.177*
(2.19) (1.93) (1.98)
- widowed 0.640** 0.609** 0.633***
(2.83) (2.71) (3.93)
Job status
- Part-time work -0.049 -0.052 -0.097
(-0.27) (-0.27) (-0.55)
- Self-employment 0.017 0.002 0.023
(0.20) (0.02) (0.26)
- Retired 0.147 0.120 0.186
(1.22) (0.97) (1.33)
- Household production -1.147** -1.169** -1.355**
(-2.93) (-2.99) (-2.81)
- Student -0.279 -0.268 -0.455
(-0.96) (-0.92) (-1.30)
- Unemployed -0.122 -0.162 -0.242*
(-1.04) (-1.35) (-1.97)
- Other -0.584*** -0.652*** -0.557***
(-4.29) (-4.59) (-4.22)
Education
- Primary education -0.278 -0.133
(-1.18) (-0.55)
- Some secondary education -0.214 -0.051
(-0.82) (-0.19)
- Secondary education -0.357 -0.197
(-1.31) (-0.73)
- Tertiary education -0.531 -0.407
(-1.89) (-1.44)
Income No No No Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,706 6,663 6,636 5,543
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Appendix N: Regressions for non-OECD countries.
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The following Tables A4-A6 present the results from regressions that replicate those in Tables
1-3 using only non-OECD countries.
Table A4: ONLY NON-OECD - Logit regressions for experience of
unemployment during last ve years; males, aged 25-55.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Follower -0.115 -0.258* -0.340* -0.467**
(-0.98) (-2.06) (-2.37) (-3.19)
Age -0.115* -0.094* -0.094* -0.079
(-2.36) (-2.33) (-2.22) (-1.60)
Age squared 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001
(2.20) (1.85) (1.73) (1.08)
Legal status
- married -0.351** -0.414*** -0.422**
(-2.84) (-3.30) (-2.85)
- divorced -0.025 -0.094 -0.302*
(-0.19) (-0.65) (-2.28)
- widowed -0.548 -0.670 -0.846
(-1.41) (-1.72) (-1.64)
Job status
- Part-time work 0.514* 0.495* 0.429
(2.14) (2.05) (1.61)
- Self-employment 0.131 0.084 0.150
(0.95) (0.54) (0.88)
- Retired 0.880** 0.839** 0.752**
(3.13) (3.20) (2.59)
- Household production 2.034*** 2.040*** 2.171***
(5.96) (5.45) (8.07)
- Student 1.727** 1.803** 1.790***
(3.12) (2.62) (3.89)
- Unemployed 2.856*** 2.787*** 2.503***
(12.91) (12.63) (11.69)
- Other 1.663*** 1.569*** 1.343**
(4.14) (3.70) (3.28)
Education
- Primary education 2.626** 2.798*
(2.62) (2.56)
- Some secondary education 2.102* 2.098*
(2.34) (2.15)
- Secondary education 1.691 1.794
(1.76) (1.70)
- Tertiary education 1.194 1.546
(1.21) (1.45)
Income No No No Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,771 4,736 4,723 4,143
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A5: ONLY NON-OECD - Ordered logit regressions for
strength of work norms; males, aged 25-55.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Follower 0.121 0.123 0.117 0.187*
(1.46) (1.48) (1.41) (2.06)
Age 0.009 -0.019 -0.019 -0.020
(0.30) (-0.69) (-0.70) (-0.62)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.17) (1.05) (1.04) (1.04)
Legal status
- married 0.257*** 0.251*** 0.279***
(3.42) (3.32) (3.75)
- divorced -0.021 -0.027 0.012
(-0.13) (-0.17) (0.06)
- widowed 0.396 0.409 0.333
(1.36) (1.37) (1.09)
Job status
- Part-time work -0.200* -0.201* -0.235*
(-2.08) (-2.12) (-2.12)
- Self-employment 0.094 0.094 0.125
(0.84) (0.82) (0.96)
- Retired -0.096 -0.093 -0.216
(-0.54) (-0.51) (-1.04)
- Household production -0.600** -0.593** -0.692**
(-2.63) (-2.77) (-2.92)
- Student -0.111 -0.112 -0.196
(-0.25) (-0.25) (-0.53)
- Unemployed -0.205* -0.203* -0.268**
(-2.05) (-2.10) (-2.88)
- Other 0.089 0.085 0.009
(0.33) (0.32) (0.04)
Education
- Primary education -0.299 -0.199
(-0.90) (-0.57)
- Some secondary education -0.650 -0.551
(-1.71) (-1.43)
- Secondary education -0.516 -0.402
(-1.58) (-1.28)
- Tertiary education -0.545 -0.392
(-1.59) (-1.14)
Income No No No Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,748 4,709 4,697 4,143
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A6: ONLY NON-OECD - Ordered logit regressions for
strength of work norms with father unemployed; males, aged 25-55.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Follower 0.121 0.123 0.117 0.187*
(1.46) (1.48) (1.41) (2.06)
Father unemployed 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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(.) (.) (.) (.)
Age 0.009 -0.019 -0.019 -0.020
(0.30) (-0.69) (-0.70) (-0.62)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.17) (1.05) (1.04) (1.04)
Legal status
- married 0.257*** 0.251*** 0.279***
(3.42) (3.32) (3.75)
- divorced -0.021 -0.027 0.012
(-0.13) (-0.17) (0.06)
- widowed 0.396 0.409 0.333
(1.36) (1.37) (1.09)
Job status
- Part-time work -0.200* -0.201* -0.235*
(-2.08) (-2.12) (-2.12)
- Self-employment 0.094 0.094 0.125
(0.84) (0.82) (0.96)
- Retired -0.096 -0.093 -0.216
(-0.54) (-0.51) (-1.04)
- Household production -0.600** -0.593** -0.692**
(-2.63) (-2.77) (-2.92)
- Student -0.111 -0.112 -0.196
(-0.25) (-0.25) (-0.53)
- Unemployed -0.205* -0.203* -0.268**
(-2.05) (-2.10) (-2.88)
- Other 0.089 0.085 0.009
(0.33) (0.32) (0.04)
Education
- Primary education -0.299 -0.199
(-0.90) (-0.57)
- Some secondary education -0.650 -0.551
(-1.71) (-1.43)
- Secondary education -0.516 -0.402
(-1.58) (-1.28)
- Tertiary education -0.545 -0.392
(-1.59) (-1.14)
Income No No No Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,748 4,709 4,697 4,143
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Appendix O: Regressions that control for employment in agriculture.
The following Tables A7-A9 present the results from regressions that replicate those in Tables
1-3 except for adding a dummy variable that controls for an occupation in agriculture. For the
sample at hand, this is dened as an ISCO-code between 6000 and 6210.
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Table A7: Logit regressions for experience of unemployment during
last ve years; males, aged 25-55.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Follower -0.206* -0.310** -0.373*** -0.424***
(-2.17) (-3.02) (-3.51) (-3.75)
Farming 0.065 0.166 0.044 -0.145
(0.40) (0.98) (0.29) (-0.95)
Age -0.124*** -0.083** -0.086** -0.081*
(-4.06) (-3.04) (-3.08) (-2.43)
Age squared 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001
(3.63) (2.22) (2.21) (1.65)
Legal status
- married -0.376*** -0.405*** -0.328***
(-5.26) (-5.70) (-3.71)
- divorced 0.115 0.079 -0.002
(1.09) (0.74) (-0.02)
- widowed -0.532 -0.632* -0.670
(-1.74) (-2.08) (-1.85)
Job status
- Part-time work 0.662*** 0.657*** 0.578**
(3.72) (3.76) (3.19)
- Self-employment 0.020 0.001 0.075
(0.18) (0.01) (0.58)
- Retired 0.637** 0.575** 0.426
(3.13) (2.85) (1.95)
- Household production 2.069*** 2.055*** 2.069***
(7.36) (6.86) (7.39)
- Student 0.945** 1.022** 0.529
(3.07) (3.21) (1.18)
- Unemployed 3.225*** 3.167*** 2.820***
(18.72) (18.39) (16.52)
- Other 1.639*** 1.528*** 1.202***
(7.25) (6.88) (5.74)
Education
- Primary education 1.037* 1.285*
(1.99) (2.29)
- Some secondary education 0.776 1.057
(1.48) (1.83)
- Secondary education 0.431 0.739
(0.80) (1.23)
- Tertiary education 0.019 0.562
(0.03) (0.93)
Income No No No Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,559 11,479 11,438 9,760
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A8: Ordered logit regressions for strength of work norms;
males, aged 25-55.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Follower 0.156** 0.154** 0.139* 0.181**
(2.64) (2.65) (2.26) (2.77)
Farming 0.009 -0.006 -0.050 -0.110
(0.08) (-0.05) (-0.49) (-1.03)
Age 0.005 -0.024 -0.027 -0.037
(0.28) (-1.42) (-1.58) (-1.86)
Age squared 0.000 0.000+ 0.000 0.001*
(0.29) (1.72) (1.86) (2.15)
Legal status
- married 0.259*** 0.250*** 0.230***
(4.79) (4.63) (4.51)
- divorced 0.113 0.098 0.101
(1.45) (1.24) (1.16)
- widowed 0.505* 0.478* 0.427*
(2.54) (2.36) (2.13)
Job status
- Part-time work -0.136 -0.141 -0.176
(-1.38) (-1.41) (-1.79)
- Self-employment 0.047 0.036 0.064
(0.70) (0.53) (0.84)
- Retired 0.041 0.022 -0.008
(0.39) (0.21) (-0.07)
- Household production -0.747*** -0.753*** -0.855***
(-3.56) (-3.52) (-3.40)
- Student -0.215 -0.210 -0.367
(-0.89) (-0.86) (-1.31)
- Unemployed -0.166* -0.196** -0.269***
(-2.22) (-2.62) (-3.77)
- Other -0.396** -0.440** -0.417**
(-2.76) (-2.99) (-3.09)
Education
- Primary education -0.319 -0.209
(-1.66) (-1.08)
- Some secondary education -0.369 -0.246
(-1.73) (-1.17)
- Secondary education -0.424* -0.297
(-2.09) (-1.53)
- Tertiary education -0.540* -0.416*
(-2.56) (-2.00)
Income No No No Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,454 11,372 11,333 9,686
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A9: Ordered logit regressions for strength of work norms;
males, aged 25-55.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Follower 0.155** 0.154** 0.138* 0.181**
(2.63) (2.64) (2.25) (2.76)
Father unemployed -0.731*** -0.723*** -0.766*** -0.386***
(-27.08) (-11.83) (-9.76) (-4.28)
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Farming 0.008 -0.006 -0.050 -0.110
(0.08) (-0.05) (-0.50) (-1.03)
Age 0.005 -0.024 -0.027 -0.037
(0.28) (-1.42) (-1.58) (-1.86)
Age squared 0.000 0.000+ 0.000 0.001*
(0.29) (1.72) (1.86) (2.15)
Legal status
- married 0.259*** 0.250*** 0.230***
(4.81) (4.65) (4.51)
- divorced 0.113 0.099 0.101
(1.45) (1.24) (1.16)
- widowed 0.513* 0.486* 0.430*
(2.57) (2.39) (2.14)
Job status
- Part-time work -0.136 -0.141 -0.176+
(-1.38) (-1.41) (-1.79)
- Self-employment 0.047 0.036 0.064
(0.69) (0.52) (0.84)
- Retired 0.040 0.020 -0.009
(0.39) (0.20) (-0.07)
- Household production -0.733*** -0.738*** -0.844***
(-3.50) (-3.46) (-3.39)
- Student -0.216 -0.211 -0.367
(-0.89) (-0.86) (-1.32)
- Unemployed -0.166* -0.196** -0.270***
(-2.22) (-2.63) (-3.77)
- Other -0.397** -0.441** -0.418**
(-2.76) (-3.00) (-3.09)
Education
- Primary education -0.315 -0.207
(-1.63) (-1.07)
- Some secondary education -0.368 -0.245
(-1.72) (-1.16)
- Secondary education -0.424* -0.297
(-2.08) (-1.53)
- Tertiary education -0.540* -0.415*
(-2.55) (-2.00)
Income No No No Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,454 11,372 11,333 9,686
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Appendix P: Summary of results for each major ISCO-group.
The following Table A10 reports the coe¢cients for the three variables of interest from
regressions that replicate those in Tables 1-3 separatedly for each occupational group of the
respondents. For brevity, only results pertaining to the richest specication - specication (4) -
are shown.
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Table A10: The three variables of interest separately for each oc-
cupational group of the respondents.
(Experience of unemployment) (Follower) (Father unemployed)
Legislators, senior o¢cials
and managers.
-0.543 0.060 -1.332***
(-1.20) (0.31) (-6.65)
Professionals. -0.779* 0.450 0.000
(-1.99) (1.92) (.)
Technicans and associate pro-
fessionals
-0.515 0.405 -1.458*
(-1.02) (1.69) (-2.49)
Clerks. -0.448 -0.445 0.000
(-0.46) (-0.70) (.)
Service workers and shop and
market sales workers.
-1.946* 0.203 0.000
(-2.34) (0.57) (.)
Skilled agricultural and sh-
ery workers.
-1.180 0.591** 0.000
(-1.91) (2.98) (.)
Craft and related trade work-
ers.
-0.589** 0.223* -0.014
(-3.11) (2.22) (-0.04)
Plant and machine operators
and assemblers.
-0.049 -0.128 0.000
(-0.15) (-0.59) (.)
Elementary occupations. -0.197 0.267 0.000
(-0.58) (0.97) (.)
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
The following Table A11 reports the coe¢cients for the three variables of interest from
regressions that replicate those in Tables 1-3 separatedly for each occupational group of the
fathers. For brevity, only results pertaining to the richest specication - specication (4) - are
shown.
Table A11: The three variables of interest separately for each oc-
cupational group of the fathers.
(Experience of unemployment) (Follower) (Father unemployed)
Legislators, senior o¢cials
and managers.
-0.485 0.214 0.000
(-1.29) (1.04) (.)
Professionals. -0.505 0.713** 0.000
(-1.21) (3.23) (.)
Technicans and associate pro-
fessionals
-0.301 0.496 0.000
(-0.54) (1.61) (.)
Clerks. -0.806 -0.706 0.000
(-0.67) (-1.24) (.)
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Service workers and shop and
market sales workers.
-1.827* 0.268 14.878***
(-2.29) (0.61) (15.03)
Skilled agricultural and sh-
ery workers.
-1.015* 0.313 -0.770**
(-2.11) (1.81) (-3.19)
Craft and related trade work-
ers.
-0.722*** 0.256* 0.000
(-3.72) (2.43) (.)
Plant and machine operators
and assemblers.
-0.016 -0.175 0.000
(-0.05) (-0.81) (.)
Elementary occupations. 0.082 0.077 0.000
(0.23) (0.31) (.)
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Appendix Q: Daughter-father regressions.
The following Tables A12-A14 present the results from regressions that replicate those in
Tables 1-3 using only female respondents.
Table A12: Logit regressions for experience of unemployment dur-
ing last ve years; females, aged 25-55.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Follower -0.183 -0.240 -0.285* -0.322
(-1.28) (-1.74) (-2.09) (-1.90)
Age -0.139*** -0.087** -0.095** -0.087*
(-5.07) (-2.90) (-3.04) (-2.52)
Age squared 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001
(4.16) (1.97) (2.04) (1.56)
Legal status
- married -0.238** -0.271** -0.128
(-2.79) (-3.20) (-1.43)
- divorced 0.169 0.117 0.038
(1.74) (1.22) (0.35)
- widowed 0.096 0.022 -0.046
(0.66) (0.15) (-0.27)
Job status
- Part-time work 0.482*** 0.457*** 0.424**
(3.82) (3.74) (3.29)
- Self-employment 0.196 0.139 0.094
(1.31) (0.87) (0.50)
- Retired 0.762** 0.684* 0.643*
(2.79) (2.43) (2.33)
- Household production 1.429*** 1.319*** 1.295***
(9.29) (8.59) (7.73)
- Student 0.801** 0.729* 0.600*
(2.68) (2.38) (1.98)
- Unemployed 3.207*** 3.102*** 2.989***
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(19.38) (18.44) (16.26)
- Other 1.131*** 1.044*** 0.905***
(5.12) (4.73) (4.19)
Education
- Primary education 0.066 0.272
(0.16) (0.84)
- Some secondary education -0.124 0.047
(-0.32) (0.15)
- Secondary education -0.306 -0.031
(-0.80) (-0.10)
- Tertiary education -0.732* -0.376
(-1.99) (-1.16)
Income No No No Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,968 12,854 12,797 10,736
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A13: Ordered logit regressions for strength of work norms;
females, aged 25-55.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Follower 0.071 0.059 0.029 0.032
(0.69) (0.58) (0.30) (0.30)
Age 0.016 0.004 0.003 0.002
(0.78) (0.18) (0.14) (0.10)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.38) (0.18) (0.18) (0.24)
Legal status
- married 0.058 0.046 0.045
(0.93) (0.72) (0.62)
- divorced -0.096 -0.120 -0.149
(-1.26) (-1.55) (-1.81)
- widowed 0.053 0.024 -0.028
(0.49) (0.22) (-0.25)
Job status
- Part-time work -0.054 -0.067 -0.038
(-0.83) (-0.95) (-0.50)
- Self-employment 0.035 0.017 0.049
(0.49) (0.25) (0.59)
- Retired -0.099 -0.125 -0.112
(-0.77) (-0.98) (-0.91)
- Household production -0.254*** -0.296*** -0.291***
(-3.96) (-4.32) (-3.91)
- Student -0.426 -0.431 -0.461
(-1.52) (-1.52) (-1.58)
- Unemployed -0.188** -0.288*** -0.240***
(-3.04) (-3.76) (-3.65)
- Other -0.279* -0.322** -0.402***
(-2.45) (-2.89) (-3.46)
Education
- Primary education -0.189 -0.266
(-0.78) (-1.01)
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- Some secondary education -0.249 -0.338
(-0.94) (-1.16)
- Secondary education -0.356 -0.429
(-1.39) (-1.52)
- Tertiary education -0.461 -0.549
(-1.78) (-1.89)
Income No No No Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,825 12,712 12,654 10,642
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A14: Ordered logit regressions for strength of work norms;
females, aged 25-55.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Follower 0.071 0.059 0.029 0.032
(0.69) (0.58) (0.30) (0.30)
Father unemployed 1.002*** 0.974*** 0.851*** 0.485***
(32.70) (30.10) (17.90) (7.21)
Age 0.016 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.78) (0.18) (0.14) (0.10)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.39) (0.18) (0.18) (0.24)
Legal status
- married 0.058 0.046 0.046
(0.93) (0.73) (0.62)
- divorced -0.095 -0.119 -0.148
(-1.24) (-1.53) (-1.79)
- widowed 0.053 0.024 -0.028
(0.49) (0.23) (-0.24)
Job status
- Part-time work -0.054 -0.067 -0.038
(-0.84) (-0.95) (-0.51)
- Self-employment 0.035 0.017 0.049
(0.49) (0.25) (0.59)
- Retired -0.098 -0.125 -0.112
(-0.77) (-0.98) (-0.91)
- Household production -0.254*** -0.296*** -0.291***
(-3.96) (-4.32) (-3.91)
- Student -0.426 -0.430 -0.461
(-1.52) (-1.52) (-1.58)
- Unemployed -0.188** -0.228*** -0.240***
(-3.04) (-3.75) (-3.65)
- Other -0.279* -0.332** -0.403***
(-2.45) (-2.90) (-3.46)
Education
- Primary education -0.192 -0.267
(-0.79) (-1.02)
- Some secondary education -0.248 -0.338
(-0.94) (-1.15)
- Secondary education -0.355 -0.428
(-1.38) (-1.52)
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- Tertiary education -0.460 -0.549
(-1.78) (-1.89)
Income No No No Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,822 12,709 12,651 10,640
t-Statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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